# **15-122: Principles of Imperative Computation**

### Lab 13: PasswordLab

**Collaboration:** In lab, we encourage collaboration and discussion as you work through the problems. These activities, like recitation, are meant to get you to review what we've learned, look at problems from a different perspective and allow you to ask questions about topics you don't understand. We encourage discussing problems with other students in this lab!

**Setup:** Download the lab handout and code from the course website https://web2.qatar.cmu.edu/~mhhammou/15 s23/schedule.html, and move it to your private directory in your unix.qatar.cmu.edu machine. Following that create a directory, move the handout to it, and unzip the handout file by executing the following commands:

```
% mkdir lab_13
% mv 13-handout.tgz lab_13
% cd lab_13
% tar -xvf 13-handout.tgz
```

#### Submission:

Create a tar file by executing the command below and submit it to autolab, under the lab name:

% tar cfzv handin.tgz answers.txt

## Dr. Evil's passwords

Genius supervillian Dr. Evil is on the loose! Known for a series of devilishly tricky yet completely vulnerable assembly bombs, Dr. Evil has left a trail of destruction across Carnegie Mellon's undergraduate computer science curriculum. Authorities have been unable to track the whereabouts of this mastermind, but we have new intelligence on Dr. Evil's Super Secret Evil Plan<sup>TM</sup> to investigate.

You have been hired as an agent to crack the code of Dr. Evil's Super Secret Evil Plan. It seems that she left her secret plans in a password protected c0 binary file, accessible to you on the cluster computers by typing evilplan. She also accidentally left her COVM bytecode in a public folder! She seems to have deleted most of the helpful comments, though, so we'll need help figuring out the passwords by hand. We were also able to acquire the main function's source code in password-main.c0, but it relies on functions that only appear in the bytecode file password.bc0.

You'll need to read through password.bc0 to figure out some of the function calls — namely, the function calls password1(), password2(), password3(), etc.

Each of the password functions either takes in a password as input, and returns a boolean, or simply returns the password as an integer. Some passwords are numbers while others are strings. For the first four passwords the user's input is passed to **parse\_int**, but for the last password the string is passed directly to the function. We've filled in the bytecode file with all the intelligence we have, so you'll have to figure out the rest.

Write your answers in the file answers.txt, which you will submit to autolab.

A description of relevant C0VM bytecode instructions is given in appendix.

To check if you're correct, just run the password binary file, and type in the passwords you think are correct:

### Spring 2023

# Tuesday April 11<sup>th</sup>

Super Secret Evil Plan. If you are anyone else, get OUT. Password1:

#### Lab 13: PasswordLab

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- (1.a) Dr. Evil's first password function seems pretty simple. It seems to return an integer. What is it?
- (1.b) Dr. Evil's second password is a bit more complicated. It uses vload and vstore to store some local variables. Figure out what integer password2 returns!
- (1.c) Dr. Evil's third password is definitely more complicated. It uses ildc to load integers from the integer pool. What's going on there? For this password, note that returning 1 is equivalent to returning true, and returning 0 is equivalent to returning false.
- (1.d) Dr. Evil's fourth password has a loop! The function jumps around, doing something to an integer input. What's the password?
- (1.e) Dr. Evil's fifth and final password calls a helper function, func5. Figure out what it's doing, and crack the last password! The ASCII table to the right, which includes both integer and hex values, may come in handy.
- (1.f) For the most clever of agents, Dr. Evil seems to have left a hidden 6th password. She didn't activate it in the source code file, which means it must have been so complicated even she didn't want to deal with it! Figure it out through the bytecode, and tell your TA if you think you got it.

Partial ASCII Table									
32	20	5	64	40	0	96	60	'	
33	21	!	65	41	A	97	61	а	
34	22	н	66	42	В	98	62	b	
35	23	#	67	43	С	99	63	с	
36	24	\$	68	44	D	100	64	d	
37	25	%	69	45	Е	101	65	е	
38	26	&	70	46	F	102	66	f	
39	27	,	71	47	G	103	67	g	
40	28	(	72	48	Н	104	68	h	
41	29	)	73	49	Ι	105	69	i	
42	2A	*	74	4A	J	106	6A	j	
43	2B	+	75	4B	Κ	107	6B	k	
44	2C	,	76	$4\mathrm{C}$	L	108	6C	ι	
45	2D	-	77	$4\mathrm{D}$	М	109	6D	m	
46	$2\mathrm{E}$		78	$4\mathrm{E}$	Ν	110	6E	n	
47	2F	/	79	4F	0	111	6F	0	
48	30	0	80	50	Ρ	112	70	р	
49	31	1	81	51	Q	113	71	q	
50	32	2	82	52	R	114	72	r	
51	33	3	83	53	S	115	73	S	
52	34	4	84	54	Т	116	74	t	
53	35	5	85	55	U	117	75	u	
54	36	6	86	56	۷	118	76	v	
55	37	7	87	57	W	119	77	W	
56	38	8	88	58	Х	120	78	х	
57	39	9	89	59	Y	121	79	У	
58	3A	:	90	5A	Ζ	122	7A	z	
59	3B	;	91	5B	[	123	7B	{	
60	3C	<	92	$5\mathrm{C}$	١	124	$7\mathrm{C}$		
61	3D	=	93	5D	]	125	$7\mathrm{D}$	}	
62	3E	>	94	$5\mathrm{E}$	^	126	$7\mathrm{E}$	$\sim$	
63	3F	?	95	5F	_				

3pt

4pt

#### Appendix: Selected C0VM bytecode reference

Stack operations **0x57** pop S, v -> S S, v -> S, v, v **0x59** dup 0x5F swap S, v1, v2 -> S, v2, v1 Arithmetic 0x60 iadd S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x+y:w32 0x64 isub S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x-y:w32 0x68 imul S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x\*y:w32 0x6C idiv S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x/y:w32 0x70 irem S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x%y:w32 S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x&y:w32 0x7E iand 0x80 ior S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x|y:w32 0x82 ixor S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x^y:w32 S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x<<y:w32 0x78 ishl S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S, x>>y:w32 0x7A ishr Constants S -> S, x:w32 **0x10** bipush <b> (x = (w32)b, sign extended)S -> S, x:w32  $(x = int_pool[(c1 << 8)|c2])$ **0x13** ildc <c1,c2> **0x14** aldc <c1,c2> S -> S, a:\*  $(a = \&string_pool[(c1 << 8)|c2])$ **0x01** aconst\_null S -> S, null:\* Local Variables 0x15 vload <i> S -> S, v (v = V[i])S, v -> S 0x36 vstore <i> (V[i] = v)Assertions and errors **0xBF** athrow S, a:\* -> S (c0\_user\_error(a)) **0xCF** assert S, x:w32, a:\* -> S  $(c0_assertion_failure(a) if x == 0)$ Control Flow **0x00** nop S -> S **0x9F** if\_cmpeq <01,02> S, v1, v2 -> S (pc = pc+(o1 << 8|o2) if v1 == v2)**0xA0** if\_cmpne <o1,o2> S, v1, v2 -> S (pc = pc+(o1 << 8|o2) if v1 != v2)**0xAl** if\_icmplt <01,02> S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S (pc = pc+(01<<8|02) if x < y) **0xA2** if\_icmpge <01,02> S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S (pc = pc+(01<<8|02) if x >= y) **0xA3** if\_icmpgt <ol,o2> S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S (pc = pc+(o1<<8|o2) if x > y) **0xA4** if\_icmple <o1,o2> S, x:w32, y:w32 -> S (pc = pc+(o1<<8|o2) if x <= y) **0xA7** goto <01,02> S -> S (pc = pc+(o1 << 8|o2))Functions **0xB8** invokestatic <c1,c2> S, v1, v2, ..., vn -> S, v  $(function_pool[c1<<8|c2] => g, g(v1,...,vn) = v)$ **0xB0** return ., v -> . (return v to caller) **0xB7** invokenative <c1,c2> S, v1, v2, ..., vn -> S, v (native\_pool[c1<<8|c2] => g, g(v1,...,vn) = v) Memory 0xBB new <s> S -> S, a:\* (\*a is now allocated, size <s>) S, a:\* -> S, x:w32 (x = \*a, a != NULL, load 4 bytes) 0x2E imload (\*a = x, a != NULL, store 4 bytes) S, a:\*, x:w32 -> S **0x4E** imstore (b = \*a, a != NULL, load address) 0x2F amload S, a:\* -> S, b:\* S, a:\*, b:\* -> S (\*a = b, a != NULL, store address) **0x4F** amstore

0x34	cmload	S, a:* -> S, x:w32	(x = (w32)(*a), a != NULL, load 1 byte)
0x55	cmstore	S, a:*, x:w32 -> S	<pre>(*a = x &amp; 0x7f, a != NULL, store 1 byte)</pre>
0x62	aaddf <f></f>	S, a:* -> S, (a+f):*	<pre>(a != NULL; f field offset in bytes)</pre>
0xBC	newarray <s></s>	S, n:w32 -> S, a:*	<pre>(a[0n) now allocated,</pre>
			each array element has size <s>)</s>
0xBE	arraylength	S, a:* -> S, n:w32	$(n = \length(a))$
0x63	aadds	S, a:*, i:w32 -> S, (	<pre>(a-&gt;elems+s*i):*</pre>